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1 Introduction
Shipping goods internationally is risky and takes time. Therefore, trading partners not only
have to agree on the specification and the price of a good, but also need to decide on the timing
of payments. To allocate risk and to finance the time gap between production and sale, a range
of different payment contracts is utilized. These can be broadly classified into exporter finance
(Open Account), importer finance (Cash in Advance) and bank finance (Letter of Credit).1
In this paper, I study the optimal choice between these three types of payment contracts,
considering one shot transactions, repeated transactions and implications for trade. The equi-
librium contract is determined by financial market characteristics and contracting environments
in the source and the destination country. A transaction should, in general, be financed by the
firm in the country with the lower financing costs and the weaker contract enforcement. This
minimizes interest rate costs and the probability that the trading partner which did not pre-
finance the transaction defaults on its contractual obligations. When two firms in countries
with weak contract enforcement trade with each other, bank finance (Letter of Credit) is most
useful as it resolves the moral hazard problem of defaulting.2 Repeated transactions are an
alternative way to reduce trade risk as the continuation value of a trading relationship gives
firms an additional incentive to fulfill contracts. Therefore, they make exporter finance (Open
Account) and importer finance (Cash in Advance) relatively more attractive compared to bank
finance (Letter of Credit).
Through the payment contract choice, financing costs and contracting environments in the
source and the destination country interact to shape trade finance costs. These are variable
trade costs proportional to the value of goods exported, isomorphic to the iceberg trade cost
formulation as introduced by Samuelson (1954). Being an obstacle to trade, trade finance costs
affect trade patterns. Exports increase in enforcement probabilities and decrease in financing
costs. The latter effect is the larger, the longer it takes from production to sale.
The availability of different payment contracts can be beneficial if financial conditions
change. Suppose, for example, a country experiences a financial crisis that leads to a rise
in interest rates. Then, a payment contract switch can limit adverse effects by moving the
financing activity to the country of the trading partner. This is not possible if financial condi-
1According to survey evidence reported in IMF (2009), 42-48 percent of transactions are done through Open
Account, which corresponds to pure exporter financing. Cash in Advance, which represents pure importer
financing, accounts for 19-22 percent and bank intermediated transactions account for the rest of transactions.
The wide use of different working capital practices is also documented by Wagner Ricci and Morrison (1996),
who surveyed Fortune 200 companies.
2I also study the case of intermediate type contracts with a partial pre-payment. They are a means to reduce
financing costs, but cannot resolve the moral hazard problem of the importer.
tions in both countries deteriorate at the same time. Therefore, multilateral crises should have
a larger impact on trade flows than national crises.
I illustrate in a numerical example that the choice between payment contracts is economically
relevant. In a baseline calibration, export quantities of a country decrease by up to 20.1 percent,
when all firms are forced to use exporter finance (Open Account) only.
In the empirical part of the paper, I test key predictions of the model using a panel of
bilateral trade flows. I run gravity regressions including interaction terms between distance and
financing costs in the source and the destination country to identify the effect of trade finance
on trade flows. I find that two countries trade less with each other if their financing costs are
higher. As predicted, this effect is the larger, the more time is needed for trade.3 Results are
highly significant and economically relevant.
The paper is related to two strands of theoretical literature. First, there is a large number
of papers that study the use of trade credit between firms. Trade credit usually refers to
downstream lending between firms in a supply chain, both inside a country and across borders.
International trade credit therefore corresponds to one of the three payment contracts considered
in this paper, namely Open Account. The literature has concentrated on the relationship of
two firms inside a country and has studied under which circumstances trade credit is used as
a substitute for bank credit and what the underlying costs and benefits are.4 In this paper,
the focus is instead on the trade-off between financing costs and contracting environments in
different countries to optimally finance trade transactions. The analysis abstracts from any
frictions that could imply a wedge between bank and firm finance inside a country, which is the
central issue studied in the trade credit literature.
Second, there are theoretical papers that have considered the relationship between financial
market conditions and international trade. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) show how sovereign
default risk and credit market imperfections can result in differences in interest rates and tight-
ness of credit rationing in equilibrium, respectively, and create a comparative advantage. In
Matsuyama (2005), the share of revenues an entrepreneur can pledge towards wage payments
differs between countries leading to a comparative advantage.5 Chaney (2005) develops a the-
oretical model analyzing financial constraints in a heterogeneous firms trade model based on
Melitz (2003). Firms have to finance their fixed entry cost into foreign markets through own
3As no direct time to trade data is available, I use geographical distance as a proxy for the time needed for
trade.
4See Biais and Gollier (1997), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Wilner (2000), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cunat
(2007) and Giannetti et al. (forthcoming).
5The broader issue of institutional constraints, trade and outsourcing has been studied extensively. Recent
contributions include Nunn (2007), Levchenko (2007) and Antra`s et al. (2009). For a survey see Helpman (2006).
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liquidity and domestic operating profits. Liquidity is introduced as a second type of heterogene-
ity. He derives conditions on productivity and liquidity under which a firm exports. Manova
(2008b) extends this model to a setting where also export volumes can be affected by financial
constraints. In Chaney (2005) and Manova (2008b) only domestic financial market conditions
in the form of financial constraints are relevant for the export decisions of firms. In partic-
ular, there is no role for financial market conditions and the contracting environment in the
destination country and for the costs of trade finance.
While there is no paper that formally studies the choice of payment contracts for trade
finance, some other aspects of trade finance are discussed in policy papers.6 Finally, my paper
relates to two, more recent contributions on theoretical aspects of trade finance. Ahn (2010)
studies why international transactions might get relatively riskier and why credit supply con-
straints might affect international trade loans relatively more in a financial crisis. Olsen (2010)
elaborates on the idea also discussed in this paper, that enforcement between banks might be
easier than between two trading partners, as the former interact more frequently.
There is a large empirical literature that has provided evidence on the relationship between
the financial development of a country and the sectoral concentration of its exports. The
general finding is that financial development creates a comparative advantage in industries that
are more financially dependent and in which assets are less tangible.7 The question whether
financial constraints affect the decision to export and export volumes is the focus of a growing
number of papers. This literature has so far been inconclusive on the question of causality
from financial conditions to exporting decisions as endogeneity remains a key concern.8 Amiti
and Weinstein (2009) resolve the endogeneity problem using Japanese matched firm-bank data.
They identify a bank-firm trade finance channel and find that it accounts for about one third
of the decline in exports during the crisis in Japan in the 1990s.9
Several authors have studied factors that led to the large drop in international trade in the
6Dorsey (2009) reviews results from a recent survey by the IMF and the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade
and argues that the increased costs and the reduced availability of trade finance reduced trade during the recent
financial crisis. Auboin (2009), in the context of public support programs to reduce trade finance frictions, also
emphasizes the importance of trade finance. In a policy paper, Menichini (2009) discusses inter-firm trade finance.
She emphasizes the possibility that shocks are propagated through credit chains. Furthermore, she argues that
the use of trade finance might be restricted if institutions like contract enforcement and bankruptcy laws are
not sufficiently developed. Ellingsen and Vlachos (2009) develop a model of trade credit in a liquidity crisis.
They show that in the presence of liquidity hoarding, targeted support of trade finance might be better than
increasing the general supply of credit in an economy. Evidence on firm level trade finance of African exporters
is documented by Humphrey (2009).
7See Beck (2002), Beck (2003), Hur et al. (2006) and Manova (2008b).
8Using firm level data, this question has been addressed by Greenaway et al. (2007), Muuˆls (2008), Stiebale
(2008), Berthou (2008), Berman and He´ricourt (2010) and Bellone et al. (2010). Manova (2008a) and Manova
(2008b) studies credit constraints using sectoral level data.
9The effects of previous crises on trade have also been studied by Ronci (2004) and Iacovone and Zavacka
(2009).
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recent financial crisis. Besides demand side and composition effects (see Eaton et al. (2009),
Levchenko et al. (2009), Behrens et al. (2010), Yi et al. (2010)) and inventory adjustments
(Alessandria et al. (2010)), some research also provides evidence for the role of financial factors.
Berman and Martin (2009) analyze how a financial crisis affects trade and find that its effects
are stronger and longer lasting for African than for other countries. They find furthermore
that African countries with a higher than median trade credit over exports ratio are hit harder.
Bricongne et al. (2010) study french firm level data. While they find effects of credit constraints
at the firm level, they argue that, as the share of constrained firms is small, aggregate effects
through this channel are limited. Chor and Manova (2010) study US imports and find a negative
relationship between interbank rates in a country and its exports in more financially dependent
sectors during the recent crisis. Using data from a private trade insurance company, van der
Veer (2010) estimates that about 5 to 9 percent of the drop in world exports was due to a
reduction in trade insurance coverage.
The empirical part of the paper differs from the existing literature in three aspects. First,
motivated by the theoretical results, I consider financing costs both in the source and the
destination country.10 Second, a financial market efficiency measure, the net interest margin, is
used, to study the effects of financing costs on trade flows.11 Finally, a distance interaction is
employed to test for an effect of financial conditions proportional to the time needed for trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a model of payment
contracts. Section 3 extends the analysis to repeated contracts. Section 4 sets the model into a
standard intra-industry trade framework, derives implications for trade patterns, evaluates the
quantitative importance of payment contracts and discusses payment contract switches. Section
5 presents empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Payment Contracts
To allocate risk and to finance the time gap between the production and the sale of a product,
a wide range of payment contracts is utilized. I study the optimal choice of trading part-
ners between these contracts, considering three representative types. These are Open Account
(exporter finance), Cash in Advance (importer finance) and Letter of Credit (bank finance).
Furthermore, an analysis of an intermediate type contract, combining exporter finance and
10An exception is Manova (2008b), who, in a recent revision mentions results from a regression with destination
country variables. She finds effects about one third of the size of the exporter variables.
11While the net interest rate margin has not been used in this context, empirical work by Chor and Manova
(2010) and Korinek et al. (2010) studies the relationship of trade flows with interbank rates and the US high
yield spread during the recent financial crisis, respectively.
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importer finance, is provided.
The choice between different payment contracts is relevant for two reasons. First, the
time gap between the production of goods and the realization of sales revenues is longer for
international trade than for domestic sales. As Hummels (2001) reports, physical transport
times can be substantial in international trade, in particular, when goods are transported by sea.
Additionally, Djankov et al. (2010) document that formal procedures necessary for international
trade transactions can be extensive, implying a delay from the factory gate to the means of
transportation as well as at the border of the importer. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) calculate
that these two causes of delay add up to approximately two months for the median case.12 This
implies that working capital requirements for international trade are larger than for domestic
sales.
Second, it is more difficult to enforce contracts across borders. This can be due to differences
in legal systems or working languages and a limited willingness of governments to enforce inter-
national contracts to the same degree as national ones. Whereas domestic sales naturally take
place in a common contracting environment, international trade in general does not. Further-
more, in international trade, a firm might not have a permanent representation in the country
of the trading partner, making litigation more difficult and costly. Consequently, international
trade is more risky and the allocation of risk more important.
2.1 Setup
Suppose there is one exporter and one importer. The exporter can make a take it or leave it
offer to the importer. There are two points in time. At t = 0 firms agree on a payment contract
and the exporter can produce and send goods off to the destination country. After t time units,
goods can arrive and sales revenues can be realized. Denote production costs by K and revenues
by R. Assume further that R > K.
There are two imperfections in the economy. First, markets to finance international trade
transactions are segmented and efficiencies of financial intermediaries differ across countries.
As a result the interest rate a firm faces depends on its location. Second, there is limited
enforcement of contracts, modeled as an exogenous country-specific probability that a contract
will be enforced, in case that a firm does not want to fulfill it voluntarily.13 Under Cash in
12The median numbers they quote are 21 days from factory to ship in the exporting country and 23 days from
the ship to the warehouse in the importing country. Average sea transport time to the US accounts for another
20 days in their calculation.
13This captures the reduced form of an enforcement game played between the importer and the exporter, which
is affected by the legal institutions of the two countries. This could be extended to a model in which firms choose
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Advance, it is the probability that the exporter is forced to deliver the goods after receiving the
payment. Under Open Account, it is the probability that an importer has to pay the agreed
price for the goods after receiving and selling them.14 Furthermore, assume that the amount to
be paid by the importer for the goods traded cannot exceed their total value at market prices.15
In the following, I formally describe the three financing forms and derive conditions under which
each of them is chosen. Let λ and r denote the enforcement probability and the interest rate in
the source country, respectively. Variables for the destination country are marked with asterisks.
2.2 Cash in Advance, Open Account and Letter of Credit
Cash in Advance Under Cash in Advance (CIA) the importer first pays the amount CCIA
to the exporter. With probability λ the contract is enforced. In this case the exporter produces
the goods at cost K and delivers them to the importer, who sells them for R. The exporter
makes a take it or leave it offer and has to respect the limited value of contract and the importer
participation constraint:
max
C
E
[
ΠCIAE
]
= CCIA − λK, (1)
s.t. CCIA ≤ R, (limited value of contract) (2)
and E
[
ΠCIAI
]
= λR− (1 + r∗)tCCIA ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer) (3)
Under CIA, the trade transaction is financed by the importer. Her participation constraint
requires that, taking the default probability into account, her expected profits are non-negative.
As the exporter has all negotiation power and the limited value of contract constraint never
binds under CIA, the participation constraint binds under the optimal contract. The optimal
payment CCIA and optimal expected profits of the exporter are:
CCIA =
λ
(1 + r∗)t
R, E
[
ΠCIAE
]
=
λ
(1 + r∗)t
R− λK. (4)
Note that the optimal payment CCIA is proportional to λ, i.e. the payment is discounted by
the probability of non-delivery by the exporter. Despite the fact that there are strictly positive
their legal expenditures to achieve or prevent enforcement. In that case the enforcement probability would change
with the value at stake and there would be an explicit role for firm heterogeneity.
14For simplicity these two enforcement probabilities are assumed to be equal. It would be an interesting
extension to consider an asymmetry here. This could be rationalized by the difference between the in-kind
nature of Open Account and the cash nature of Cash in Advance. For a formalization of this argument see
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004).
15This limited value of contract assumption corresponds to a special case of a model with wealth constraints,
where the wealth of the importer is assumed to be zero. In principle, the model could be solved for non-zero
wealth levels, but the analysis would be substantially less tractable. For details see Appendix B.
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gains from trade, under CIA, production and delivery only take place with probability λ.
Open Account Under Open Account (OA), the exporter first produces the goods at cost K
and delivers them to the importer. Then, the importer sells the goods for R. With probability
λ∗ the contract is enforced and the importer pays the amount COA to the exporter. The
maximization problem of the exporter is:
max
C
E
[
ΠOAE
]
=
1
(1 + r)t
(λ∗COA −K(1 + r)t), (5)
s.t. COA ≤ R, (limited value of contract) (6)
and E
[
ΠOAI
]
=
1
(1 + r∗)t
(R− λ∗COA) ≥ 0, (participation constraint importer) (7)
assuming that the exporter and importer discount profits with their local interest rates.16 Now,
the exporter pre-finances the trade transaction. Due to the limited value of contract constraint
the maximum payment COA that is contractible is R. If λ∗ < 1 this implies that the exporter is
not able to extract all rents from the importer, who consequently has positive expected profits.
The optimal payment amount COA and the optimal discounted expected exporter profits can
be derived as:
COA = R, E
[
ΠOAE
]
=
λ∗
(1 + r)t
R−K. (8)
Letter of Credit Under a Letter of Credit (LC), the financial transaction is secured via
a bank in the country of the exporter and the importer, respectively. Under the assumption
of no default at the bank level and perfect third party verifiability, this completely resolves
the enforcement problem at the individual contract level.17 The maximization problem of the
exporter is:
max
C
E
[
ΠLCE
]
=
1
(1 + r)t
(CLC −K(1 + r)t), (9)
s.t. CLC ≤ R, (limited value of contract) (10)
and E
[
ΠLCI
]
=
R
(1 + r∗)t
− CLC ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer) (11)
16To compare profits between CIA and OA they have to be discounted to the same time period.
17It is conceivable that full enforcement at the banking level is more likely than at the firm level. As banks tend
to have more long-term relationships, reputation building and repeated transactions ease enforcement between
them. Recently, this idea has been looked at in detail by Olsen (2010).
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With LCs both the exporter and the importer pre-finance the transaction and incur costs due to
interest rate payments. The contract enforcement problem is resolved by an indirect transaction
with banks as intermediaries. The importer does not directly pay the exporter, but first pays
the amount CLC to a local bank.18 The bank cooperates with a bank in the country of the
exporter. The latter guarantees payment upon proof of delivery. In the case of LC, the limited
value of contract constraint never binds while the participation constraint of the importer is
binding. The optimal payment CLC and discounted expected exporter profits are:
CLC =
R
(1 + r∗)t
, E
[
ΠLCE
]
=
1
[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t
R−K. (12)
Note that, as pre-financing takes place on both sides, the interest rates from both markets affect
profits. As enforcement risk is completely resolved, profits are independent of the enforcement
parameters λ and λ∗.
Comparison CIA, OA and LC The four parameters r, r∗,λ,λ∗ together with the produc-
tion cost K and sales revenue R determine a unique ordering of the different payment forms as
stated below:19
Proposition 1 Suppose R and K exogenously given. Then, the optimal choice of payment
contract is uniquely determined by the following three conditions:
i) OA ≺ CIA⇐⇒ K
R
<
λ∗(1 + r∗)t − λ(1 + r)t
[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t(1− λ) ,
ii) OA ≺ LC ⇐⇒ λ∗(1 + r∗)t > 1,
iii) LC ≺ CIA⇐⇒ K
R
<
1− λ(1 + r)t
[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t(1− λ) .
Proof. Follows directly from comparing expected discounted profits from Equations 4, 8 and
12.
Several predictions, which could be tested with transaction level data, can be derived:
Proposition 2 The usage of
i) CIA increases in λ, r and t and decreases in λ∗ and r∗.
18Often firms do not actually pay the amount to the bank in cash, but receive a credit for the amount and
period of the LC against a fee. As I assume perfect enforcement in the domestic financial market, the two are
equivalent as long as firms discount at the lending rate.
19Assume for now K and R to be exogenous and the same for all payment contracts. When introducing an
explicit demand, different payment contracts imply different optimal levels of K and R.
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ii) OA increases in λ∗, r∗ and t and decreases in λ and r.
iii) LC decreases in r, r∗, λ, λ∗ and t.
Proof. Follows from comparing Equations 4, 8 and 12.
2.3 Intermediate Type Contracts
An intermediate type contract refers to the case when part of the payment is done in advance
whereas the remainder is payed after delivery. Let φ ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of advance
payment, i.e. C0 = φC. Such a contract could be motivated by the possibility to reduce
moral hazard or by potential savings in interest rate costs compared to CIA and OA. While
under CIA and OA there is only a moral hazard problem of the exporter or the importer,
respectively, with an intermediate type contract both moral hazard problems are present. In
the following I show that under an intermediate type contract, choosing a sufficiently small
pre-payment share φ can resolve the moral hazard problem of the exporter. In the one shot
game, the importer, in contrast, as the last mover, never has an incentive to voluntarily pay
the exporter the remaining amount after delivery. Therefore, in order to fully resolve the moral
hazard problem of the importer, repeated contracts are necessary.20 I find that under certain
conditions, intermediate type contracts can improve upon OA by reducing interest rate costs,
whereas they cannot improve upon CIA.
Two sided moral hazard If both sides behave opportunistically then:
E
[
ΠIME
]
= φC +
λ∗
(1 + r)t
(1− φ)C − λK, (13)
E
[
ΠIMI
]
=
λ
(1 + r∗)t
R− φC − λ
∗
(1 + r∗)t
(1− φ)C ≥ 0, (14)
E
[
ΠIMtot
]
= λ
(
R
(1 + r∗)t
−K
)
+ λ∗(1− φ)C
[
(1 + r∗)t − (1 + r)t
[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t
]
, (15)
where E
[
ΠIMtot
]
denotes total expected profits, discounted to t = 0. This case can never be
optimal as both moral hazard problems remain, while unnecessarily high interest costs are
incurred.
20This would not be true if a (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) cost of breaking the contract was introduced. Then
the advance payment could prevent moral hazard by reducing the gain from deviating.
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Importer moral hazard In order for the exporter not to behave opportunistically, the late
payment has to be sufficiently large to outweigh the gains from running away with the advance
payment. Assume that if indifferent, the exporter fulfills the contract. Then, the exporter does
not deviate whenever the expected second period payment is at least as high as expected evaded
production costs:
λ∗
(1 + r)t
(1− φ)C ≥ (1− λ)K. (16)
This implies an upper bound on the prepayment share φ:
φ ≤ 1− (1 + r)t 1− λ
λ∗
K
C
≡ φE . (17)
Under this condition the moral hazard problem of the exporter is resolved and expected profits
are:
E
[
ΠIME
]
= φC +
λ∗
(1 + r)t
(1− φ)C −K, (18)
E
[
ΠIMI
]
=
R
(1 + r∗)t
− φC − λ
∗
(1 + r∗)t
(1− φ)C, (19)
E
[
ΠIMtot
]
=
R
(1 + r∗)t
−K + λ∗(1− φ)C
[
(1 + r∗)t − (1 + r)t
[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t
]
. (20)
When are intermediate type contracts better than CIA or OA? Consider the two possible cases.
First, if OA is optimal in the absence of intermediate type contracts, a necessary condition for
an intermediate type contract to improve the outcome is r∗ < r. Then, financing costs can be
reduced by introducing some advance payment up to the point where the incentive constraint
of the exporter is binding, i.e. φ = φE = 1− (1 + r)t 1−λλ∗ KC . Combining this with Equation 19,
the optimal payment amount can be derived as:
C =
R
(1 + r∗)t
+
(
1 + r
1 + r∗
)t 1− λ
λ∗
[(1 + r∗)t − λ∗]K. (21)
Second, if, in the absence of intermediate contracts, CIA is optimal, a necessary condition for
an intermediate contract to be preferred is r < r∗. Note that expected profits of the exporter
are linear in λ
∗
(1+r)t . Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the moral hazard problem of the importer
cannot be resolved with an intermediate type contract in the one shot game. Consequently, an
interior solution, that is an intermediate type contract, cannot be optimal in this case.
To summarize, an intermediate type contract can reduce interest rate costs if in its absence
OA is optimal. No improvement is possible if in its absence CIA is optimal. In the one shot
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game, a partial pre-payment is not sufficient to resolve the moral hazard problem of the importer.
For this, repeated contracts are necessary.
3 Repeated Contracts
In the baseline model, a one shot game between an exporter and an importer is analyzed. Often
though, trade relationships are longer lasting. Repeated transactions give rise to a continuation
value of a trade relationship, which makes the non-fulfillment of a contract less desirable. In
this section, I introduce repeated contracts between an exporter and an importer and study
under which conditions a simple trigger strategy improves upon the equilibrium of the one shot
game. I find that the ability to sustain a trigger strategy equilibrium increases with enforcement
probabilities and with the survival probability of the trade relationship. Under CIA the ability
also increases in R/K. By providing an alternative way to resolve the moral hazard problem,
trigger strategies make CIA and OA more attractive compared to LCs.
Let γ denote the probability that a given trade relationship can be continued in the next
period. As before a match between one exporter and one importer is analyzed. No new trading
relationships are created, i.e. there is no outside option to trade with another partner.21
3.1 Repeated Cash in Advance
Consider the following trigger strategy: The importer pays the full revenue amount discounted
by the interest rate, i.e. C = R(1+r∗)t . This implies that the importer participation constraint
binds. If the exporter ever fails to deliver, the importer punishes her by ending the trade
relationship. The exporter always delivers the goods. The equilibrium exists if the exporter
has no incentive to deviate, i.e. to take the money and not deliver. Note that even when
deviating, the exporter is forced to fulfill the contract with probability λ. That is, the higher
the enforcement probability at home, the less likely the exporter profits from a deviation. In
order for the trigger strategy to be an equilibrium, the discounted expected value of future trade
for the exporter VE has to be larger than the expected payoff from a deviation. The trigger
strategy equilibrium exists iff:
VE =
∞∑
n=0
(
γ
(1 + r)t
)n
(C −K) = C −K
1− (γ/(1 + r)t) > C − λK. (22)
21It would be an interesting extension to allow for the creation of new relationships via searching and matching.
This would increase the value of the outside option and make it more difficult to sustain a trigger strategy.
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Using CCIA,RC = CCIA = R(1+r∗)r this condition holds iff:
γ >
K
R (1− λ)[(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]t
1− KRλ(1 + r∗)t
. (23)
The condition is more likely to hold for a higher λ.22 As the expected gain from a deviation
decreases in domestic enforcement, implementation of the trigger strategy is the easier, the
better enforcement. Furthermore, the trigger strategy equilibrium is less difficult to sustain
when the ratio R/K increases, i.e. when revenues are relatively large compared to production
costs. As the exporter discounts the future by 1 + r, a higher interest rate makes the trigger
strategy more difficult to sustain. Finally, the higher is γ, the higher is the value of the trade
relationship and the easier is implementing the trigger strategy. As it resolves the moral hazard
problem without changing the payment amount C, a CIA trigger strategy, if implementable,
always improves upon the one shot CIA contract.
3.2 Repeated Open Account
Under OA the relevant deviation is by the importer. The equilibrium considered is as follows:
The importer always pays C. If the importer ever fails to pay, the exporter stops the relationship.
The amount C that makes the importer indifferent between adhering to the trigger strategy
equilibrium and deviating is characterized by:
VI =
∞∑
n=0
(
γ
(1 + r∗)t
)n( R− C
(1 + r∗)t
)
=
R− C
(1 + r∗)t(1− (γ/(1 + r∗)t)) =
R− λ∗C
(1 + r∗)t
. (24)
This condition determines the highest incentive compatible C that maximizes expected profits
of the exporter:
COA,RC = R
[
γ
(1− λ∗)(1 + r∗)t + λ∗γ
]
. (25)
22Re-substituting (1 + r∗)t/R = 1/C delivers:
γ >
K
C (1− λ)(1 + r)t
1− λKC
.
As C ≥ K, the right hand side is decreasing in λ.
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The amount increases in the survival probability γ and the enforcement probability abroad λ∗.
A trigger strategy improves on the one shot game if:23
γ >
λ∗
1 + λ∗
(1 + r∗)t. (26)
3.3 LC versus CIA and OA
The following proposition summarizes the results on repeated contracts above:
Proposition 3 A trigger strategy improves upon its one shot game equivalent in the case of
i) CIA if γ >
K
R (1−λ)[(1+r)(1+r∗)]t
1−KR λ(1+r∗)t
ii) OA if γ > λ
∗
1+λ∗ (1 + r
∗)t
Proof. See derivation of Equations 23 and 26.
As a LC already resolves all enforcement problems, trigger strategies cannot improve this pay-
ment contract. Therefore, the introduction of trigger strategies and repeated transactions makes
CIA and OA more attractive while leaving the LC unaffected, implying a worsening of the rela-
tive attractiveness of LCs. This is especially the case when the relationship survival probability
γ and enforcement probabilities λ and λ∗ are high. Thus longer lasting trade relationships and
trade between countries with better international contract enforcement should rely more on
CIA and OA trigger strategies and less on LCs.
3.4 Repeated Intermediate Type Contracts
When repeated transactions are considered, a pre-payment can be much more effective in pre-
venting moral hazard of the importer. Suppose both the exporter and the importer play the
following trigger strategy: fulfill contract until trading partner deviates; then, stop the trade
relationship. The exporter can credibly play this trigger strategy if and only if the sum of the
post-delivery payment by the importer and her continuation value are at least as large as the
23To see this, note that the expected payment in the one shot game is λ∗R. Therefore, the trigger strategy
increases expected profits if:
R
»
γ
(1− λ∗)(1 + r∗)t + λ∗γ − λ
∗
–
> 0
⇔ γ(1− (λ∗)2) > λ∗(1− λ∗)(1 + r∗)t.
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expected gain from a deviation:
(1− φ) C
(1 + r)t
+
∞∑
n=1
(
γ
(1 + r)t
)n(
φC −K + (1− φ) C
(1 + r)t
)
≥ (1− λ)K. (27)
⇔ (1− φ) C
(1 + r)t
+
φC −K + (1− φ) C(1+r)t
1− (γ/(1 + r)t)
γ
(1 + r)t
≥ (1− λ)K.
This can be solved for the general condition:24
φ ≤ 1
1− γ −
(1 + r)t(1− λ) + γλ
1− γ
K
C
≡ φE,RC . (28)
The importer plays the trigger strategy if and only if her continuation value is at least as large
as the expected gain from a deviation:
∞∑
n=1
(
γ
(1 + r∗)t
)n(R− (1− φ)C
(1 + r∗)t
− φC
)
≥ (1− λ∗)(1− φ)C. (29)
This equation shows that in the absence of continued trading (γ = 0), a pre-payment alone
cannot solve the importer’s moral hazard problem. Rearranging delivers:
φC
[
γ
(1 + r∗)t
− γ + ((1 + r∗)t − γ)(1− λ∗)
]
≥ ((1 + r∗)t − γ)(1− λ∗)C − γ
(1 + r∗)t
(R− C).
Assuming γ < (1+r
∗)2t(1−λ∗)
r∗+(1−λ∗)(1+r∗)t implies:
φ ≥ (1 + r
∗)t((1 + r∗)t − γ)(1− λ∗)
Λ
− γ
Λ
(
R
C
− 1
)
≡ φI,RC , (30)
with Λ = γ − γ(1 + r∗)t + (1 + r∗)t((1 + r∗)t − γ)(1− λ∗).
φI,RC represents the lower bound at which the incentive constraint of the importer is binding.
If the interval [φI,RC ,φE,RC ] is non-empty, then a trigger strategy can be implemented. Given
the possibility of an intermediate type contract, the set of parameters for which a trigger strategy
can be used increases.
Proposition 4 Suppose 0 < φI,RC ≤ φE,RC < 1. Then, repeated intermediate type contracts
can resolve the moral hazard problems of the exporter and the importer.
Proof. Omitted.
For the exporter incentive constraint to be binding, the pre-payment share φ has to be smaller
24For γ = 0 this simplifies to Condition 17 from the one shot game, corrected for the fact that the importer is
playing a trigger strategy and always pays the outstanding amount due after delivery.
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or equal to the threshold φE,RC , whereas for the importer incentive constraint to be binding,
the pre-payment share has to be greater or equal than φI,RC .
4 Trade Model
What are the implications from payment contracts for quantities, revenues and profits at the
firm level and in the aggregate? To address this question, I incorporate the baseline model from
Section 2 into a standard international trade framework as in Helpman and Krugman (1985).
The analysis delivers new predictions for the patterns of international trade flows and shows
that effects from the payment contract choice can be substantial. It furthermore reveals how
the ability to switch between different payment contracts implies differential effects of unilateral
and multilateral financial crises on trade flows.
4.1 Setup
Preferences There are L representative consumers in the economy, each supplying inelasti-
cally one unit of labor. The individual utility function is:
U = Qµq1−µ0 with Q =
(∫
Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
. (31)
Q is a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) basket of a continuum of differentiated goods
and q0 is a homogenous good. Utility is Cobb-Douglas in the homogeneous good and the
differentiated goods. The demand for the differentiated good is:
q(ω) = p(ω)−σP σQ, (32)
where ω denotes a variety of the differentiated good, P =
(∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σ)1−σ is the price index
of the optimal CES basket, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Technology Labor is the only input factor. Firms in the homogenous goods sector face
perfect competition and operate a constant returns to scale technology that requires one unit
of labor per unit of output. The homogenous good is freely traded. Only equilibria in which
every country produces the homogenous good are considered. This equalizes wages, which are
normalized to one, making the homogenous good the numeraire. In the differentiated goods
sector firms operate under monopolistic competition. Each variety is produced by only one
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firm. There is a fixed cost of entry f . The production of one unit of the differentiated product
requires a units of labor. Firms are risk neutral.
4.2 Optimal Behavior of Firms
Given CES demand and monopolistic competition, firms in the differentiated sector charge
a constant markup over marginal costs to maximize profits. Domestic prices, quantities and
profits are:
pd =
σ
σ − 1a, qd = (pd)
−σ P σQ, Πd = qd
[
a
σ − 1
]
. (33)
To determine the optimal export decision of a firm, note that expected profits under all financing
forms can be represented by the general expression:25
E [Πx] = αR− βK. (34)
This implies the following export prices, quantities and profits:26
px =
β
α
p∗d, E [qx] = Aq
∗
d, E [Πx] = AΠ
∗
d, (35)
with A=ασβ1−σ.27
The factor A fully summarizes the effects of payment contracts on expected profits and expected
quantities. A = 1 corresponds to the frictionless case, where r = r∗ = 0 and λ = λ∗ = 1. The
parameters α and β, which represent the costs of trade finance, enter the problem proportional
to the value of exports. Thus, in the model, variable trade costs that arise from the financing
requirement and the enforcement problem correspond to the iceberg trade cost formulation.
The profits and quantities under financing form 1 are larger than under financing form 2 iff:
A1 > A2.
25From Section 2 these parameters are: for CIA α = λ(1+r∗)t and β = λ, for OA α =
λ∗
(1+r)t and β = 1 and for
LC α = 1[(1+r)(1+r∗)]t and β = 1.
26Expected profits can be normalized to E
h
Π˜x
i
= E
ˆ
Πx
α
˜
= R − βαK. Maximizing the original objective
function E [Π] implies the same optimal decisions as maximizing the new function E
h
Π˜
i
. Therefore, the price
setting problem is equivalent to the standard case with new per unit production costs of βαa.
27E [qx] is the expected quantity, taking into account that under CIA only a fraction λ of export contracts is
enforced.
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The following proposition summarizes the optimal payment contract choice:
Proposition 5 The optimal choice of payment contract is uniquely determined by the following
three conditions:
i) OA ≺ CIA⇐⇒ (λ
∗)σ
λ
(
1 + r∗
1 + r
)σt
> 1,
ii) OA ≺ LC ⇐⇒ λ∗(1 + r∗)t > 1,
iii) LC ≺ CIA⇐⇒ λ(1 + r)σt < 1.
Proof. These conditions follow directly from a comparison of expected profits.28
While expressions simplify compared to Proposition 1, the testable predictions in Proposition
2 remain valid.
4.3 Implications for Trade Patterns
Taking into account payment contracts delivers new results for international trade patterns.
In particular, as trade finance can be obtained from financial markets in the source and the
destination country, financial conditions and contracting environments in both countries affect
trade flows. The model implies the following testable predictions on trade patterns:
Proposition 6 For given foreign (home) financial conditions r∗,λ∗ (r,λ) and foreign demand
conditions P ∗ and Q∗, exports of a home firm increase in home (foreign) financial market con-
ditions,
i) strictly if both r (r∗) decreases and λ (λ∗) increases.
ii) weakly if r (r∗) decreases or λ (λ∗) increases.
iii) the more, the larger t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Exports of a firm decrease in interest rates and increase in enforcement probabilities in the
source and the destination country.29 To bring the model to the data, the following Corollary
is useful.
28Expected profits for the three financing forms are:
E
ˆ
ΠCIAE
˜
= λ (1 + r∗)−σtΠ∗d, E
ˆ
ΠOAE
˜
= (λ∗)σ(1 + r)−σtΠ∗d, E
ˆ
ΠLCE
˜
= [(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]−σtΠ∗d.
29It would be straightforward to extend the model to a heterogenous firms framework featuring selection into
exporting. Then, analog propositions for the extensive margin could be derived.
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Corollary 1 For given foreign (home) financial conditions r∗,λ∗ (r,λ) and foreign demand
conditions P ∗ and Q∗, the log of exports of a home firm increases in home (foreign) financial
market conditions.
i) strictly if both ln(1 + r) (ln(1 + r∗)) decreases and λ (λ∗) increases
ii) weakly if ln(1 + r) (ln(1 + r∗)) decreases or λ (λ∗) increases
iii) the more in ln(1 + r) (ln(1 + r∗)), the larger t and therefore also, the larger ln t
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1 implies that the effect of interest rates on trade flows is increasing in t, the time
it takes to transport goods abroad and sell them in the destination country, and therefore
increasing in ln t. This provides the theoretical basis for the distance interactions employed in
the next section.30
4.4 Economic Relevance of Payment Contracts
Is the choice between payment contracts economically relevant? To answer this question, I
present a numerical example and calculate trade flows in a two country general equilibrium
version of the model.31 Suppose there are three types of countries as described in Table 1.
Type I has a very efficient financial market and strong enforcement. Type II has a relatively
efficient financial market, but enforcement is weak. Type III has a less efficient financial market,
but relatively strong enforcement.32
here table 1
As shown earlier, these country characteristics determine the optimal payment contract for each
exporter-importer country combination. The optimal payment contracts chosen are reported in
table 2.
here table 2
Suppose firms can choose Open Account, whereas Cash in Advance and Letter of Credit are
not available. This case corresponds to exporter finance only. Below, I report the percentage
decrease in traded quantities implied by this restriction of the payment contract choice. Table
3 therefore quantifies the difference in predicted trade flows between this model and previous
30Payment contracts also imply testable prediction for observed FOB prices. See Appendix D for details.
31See Appendix C for the formal derivation. More details can be found in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2009).
32For this example, t is assumed to be 2 months. Interest rates in the table are adjusted to this short time
horizon. Annualized rates for working capital financing in this example are 1.05, 1.07 and 1.14 for the three
country types, respectively.
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models that abstract from the full choice of payment contracts available.33
here table 3
If, for example, an exporter in a country of Type I trading with an importer in a country of Type
II is forced to use OA instead of CIA, this reduces her exported quantity by 16.1 percent. The
results show that the choice between payment contracts is economically relevant and that its
effects are heterogeneous across country pairs. Some trade, like trade between Type I countries,
does not depend very much on the payment contract in use. Trade between countries of Type
II, in contrast, which have weak contract enforcement, benefits a lot from the ability of trading
partners to avoid OA. Note that whether symmetric or asymmetric countries trade with each
other is not a good predictor of the loss from restricting the choice set. Which country-pair
combination profits the most from a free choice of payment contracts depends on the interaction
of all four parameters that characterize financial conditions and contractual environments in
the source and the destination country as shown in the previous sections.
4.5 Contract Switching and Financial Crisis
When financing costs change, firms can react by switching payment contracts to optimally
substitute between financial conditions at home and abroad.34 Suppose for example that initially
CIA is used. Then, if the interest rate abroad r∗ rises, at some point, it is optimal for the
exporter to switch to OA, the cost of which is independent of the foreign interest rate.
The ability to limit the adverse effects from changes in financial markets through payment
contracts switches implies asymmetric reactions of trade flows to financial turmoil. If there
is country-specific financial turmoil, firms can constrain costs by switching payment contracts
as described. If instead there is global financial turmoil that affects the financial markets of
both the source and the destination country, this possibility no longer exists and trade flows
react more strongly to a crisis. This suggests that in the recent global financial crisis trade
finance might have had a stronger effect on aggregate trade flows than in former more locally
concentrated crises.
33The calculations are done solving the two country model for every country type combination separately.
Exporters both in the home country and the foreign country are assumed to be constrained to use Open Account
only. Reverse trade flows (from abroad to home), which are not reported here, have an impact on price levels
and thus on traded quantities of home country exporters. Due to general equilibrium effects, restricting payment
contracts can therefore increase exports by home firms.
34For a more detailed analysis, see Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2009).
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5 Empirical Tests
The model predicts that financing costs affect trade flows. An increase in interest rates in the
source and the destination country makes trade finance more costly, implying higher export
prices and lower export quantities and revenues. Proposition 6 states that the size of this effect
should be proportional to the time needed for trade. I use a panel of bilateral trade data to
test these predictions.
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, the baseline regression is presented, providing
evidence for a negative relationship between financing costs and trade flows. I find that the size
of the effect of financing costs on trade flows is increasing in the geographical distance between
trading partners. Second, based on the results of the baseline regression, I study comparative
statics and show that the relationship is economically relevant. Next, I check the robustness of
my results. The introduction of interaction terms between geographical distance and measures
of contract enforcement (rule of law) and economic development (log of GDP per capita) to
the regression does not change the main findings. Replacing the net interest margin by private
capital over GDP as the variable capturing financial conditions delivers very similar results.
Finally, I address the question of causality.
5.1 Data
I use data on bilateral trade flows for the years 1980 to 2004 from the CEPII trade and produc-
tion database. Data on geographical distance and other bilateral indicators is from the CEPII
distance dataset. The financial market efficiency (net interest margin) and financial market
development measures (private credit over GDP) are taken from Beck et al. (2009). The net
interest margin is the ratio between the accounting value of the net interest revenues of banks
and their total earning assets. It measures the average ex-post markup of the lending activities
of banks in a country and therefore represents a measure of financial sector efficiency. This
measure differs from ex-ante spreads as it also captures losses on non-performing loans. The
alternative measure, private credit over GDP, is a much broader indicator of general financial
development. While the latter seems more appropriate for studying financial constraints, the
former seems better suited for addressing the question of trade finance and its effects on vari-
able costs studied here. Data on GDP per capita and population are taken from the Penn
World Tables (Heston et al. (2009)). The measure for contract enforcement is extracted from
the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. The final sample contains 150 exporting
countries over the period 1980-2004. When including the net interest rate margin the number
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of countries reduces to 144 and the period to 1987-2004. With contract enforcement the years
covered are 1998, 2000, and 2002-2004.
5.2 Estimation and Results
The baseline regression tests the relationship between bilateral trade flows and financing costs
(log of (1+ net interest rate margin)) in the source and the destination country. It tests both for
the direct effect of financing costs and for the effect of their interaction terms with geographical
distance.
lnYijt = ζ0 + ζ1 ln(1 + ri) + ζ2 ln(1 + rj) + ζ3 ln(distij) · ln(1 + ri) (36)
+ζ4 ln(distij) · ln(1 + rj) +
K∑
k=5
ζkX + ζK+1 ln(distij) + χi + χj + χt + *ijt.
An observation lnYijt is the log trade flow from country i to country j in year t. The regression
controls for importer, exporter and year fixed effects and for a set of control variables X. ri
and rj are the net interest margins in the source and the destination country, respectively,
and distij is the geographical distance between the two main cities of country i and j. The
control variables are the log of exporter and importer GDP per capita, exporter and importer
population and several bilateral indicators.35
Distance effect The regression reported in Column 1 of Table 4 provides evidence that
financial conditions are correlated with trade flows. Countries with higher net interest rate
margins trade less with each other. The size of this effect is increasing in the geographical
distance between trading partners. This can be seen by noting that, in line with Corollary 1,
both coefficients on the distance interaction β3 and β4 are highly significant and negative.
Economic relevance To evaluate the economic relevance of the distance interaction, consider
the following comparative statics. Compare trade between Spain and Egypt (25 percentile by
distance, 3355 km) with trade between Spain and South Korea (75 percentile by distance,
10013km). Suppose the net interest margin in Spain was one standard deviation (0.0373)
higher. Then we should expect Spain to have a 11.7 percent larger drop of its exports and a
13.6 percent larger drop of its imports when trading with South Korea compared to its trade
with Egypt, due to the larger geographical distance.
35These are: contiguity, common official language, common language (at least 9% spoken), colonial history,
common colonizer, current colonial relationship, colonial relationship post 1945 and whether countries are or were
the same country.
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Robustness One concern is potential omitted variable bias. If there are variables that are
correlated with the net interest rate margin and bilateral trade flows that are not included in
the regression, the estimate of the distance interaction can be biased. To address this issue,
Column 2 introduces two additional interaction terms. A measure of contract enforcement (rule
of law) and its interaction with distance are added to the regression to control for institutional
factors. An interaction between the log of GDP per capita and distance is added to control for
effects from the general economic development of countries. The introduction of these additional
regressors reduces the point estimates of the two coefficients for the interaction terms between
the net interest rate margins and distance to about a half of their previous values. They remain
highly significant and economically relevant.
Another concern might be the measure for financial conditions employed in the regressions so
far. The choice of the net interest margin is motivated by the theoretical part of the paper, which
focuses on financing costs of international trade. An alternative is to use private credit over
GDP as a general measure for financial development, first introduced to the literature by Beck
(2002). This is the standard measure used as a proxy for financial conditions, in particular, in
papers that study the role of financial constraints. As a robustness check, I rerun the regressions
shown in Table 4 using private credit over GDP instead of the net interest margin. The results
are reported in Table 5. They support the findings from the previous regressions. Note that
financial development increases in the ratio of private credit over GDP. That is, the higher the
ratio, the better are financial conditions. Therefore, all coefficients on the financial measure
have exactly the opposite sign from the regressions in Table 4.
Can we interpret the relationship identified by the interaction terms between distance and
the measures of financial conditions as causal? The main concern in this context is reverse
causality. If a country conducts a lot of international trade, this increases its demand for
financial services. A larger demand in turn can lead to efficiency gains in the provision of
finance, reducing the net interest rate margin.36 As discussed earlier, the distance interaction
identifies effects proportional to the geographical distance between trading partners. Therefore,
the relevant reverse causality to be considered is the following. Suppose there is an increase
in the demand from a destination country. This increases the demand for trade finance in the
source country proportional to the geographical distance from this trading partner. Reverse
causality is a problem if international trade working capital financing is sufficiently large to
have a first-order effect on the overall demand for finance in a country. While lending related
36Do and Levchenko (2007) and Braun and Raddatz (2008) find evidence for reverse causality from trade flows
and trade openness, respectively, to financial development.
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to international trade finance is certainly an important activity in many countries, it can be
argued that in most cases it represents a relatively small share of overall finance. A first-order
effect from trade finance on the borrowing rate of firms therefore seems unlikely. This suggests
that there is a causal effect of financing costs on trade, proportional to distance.
6 Conclusions
To allocate risk and to finance a transaction in international trade, firms utilize a range of
different payment contracts. This paper provides a formal model, where firms choose between
these different payment contracts to optimally trade off international differences in financing
costs and contractual environments. Trade finance costs take the form of variable trade costs,
proportional to the value of goods and the time needed for trade. This has new implications for
international trade patterns. In particular, conditions in the destination country matter and
interact with conditions in the source country in a non-trivial way. Predictions of the model are
tested using a panel of bilateral trade flows. I find that higher financing costs in the exporting
and importing country are correlated with lower trade flows. This effect is increasing in the
geographical distance between trading partners. The finding implies that financial conditions
affect trade more than domestic sales, as on average the latter are conducted over shorter
distances and take less time. The relationship is highly significant and the size of effects is
economically relevant.
The model could be extended allowing for heterogeneity both in the firm and in the product
dimension. Product differences could imply different degrees of enforceability in court or dif-
ferent time horizons of trade relationships (high or low γ). Firm differences in size could affect
the relative negotiation power between the exporter and the importer, the ability to enforce
contracts in court, the ability to punish deviations from a trigger strategy and the ability to
switch contracts in the face of fixed costs. Another extension would be to explicitly introduce
currencies and to study the interaction of the payment contract decision with exchange rate
risk. This would give a suitable framework to study two questions. First, which new effects arise
from payment contracts for the optimal decision in which currency to price exports? Second,
how this affects the transmission mechanism of international shocks?
While the aggregate regressions in this paper constitute a first step, more empirical work
is desirable. A dataset containing information on payment contracts could be used to test the
predictions from Sections 2 and 3 on the one shot game and the repeated contracts, respectively.
One of the central empirical questions in international trade regarding the importance of fixed
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costs compared to variable costs in the exporting decision of firms could be addressed with
the model as the distance interaction provides a new way to identify the variable trade cost
component of trade finance.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6 Expected quantities are E [qx] = Aq∗d = α
σβ1−σq∗d, and expected
revenues are E [Rx] = pxE [qx] = βαAR
∗
d = α
σ−1β2−σR∗d. As q
∗
d and R
∗
d are held constant, it
remains to be shown that A and βαA behave has stated in the Proposition. For the three
different financing forms we have:
ACIA = λ(1 + r∗)−σt
βCIA
αCIA
ACIA = λ(1 + r∗)(1−σ)t
AOA = (λ∗)σ(1 + r)−σt
βOA
αOA
AOA = (λ∗)σ−1(1 + r)(1−σ)t
ALC = [(1 + r)(1 + r∗)]−σt
βLC
αLC
ALC = [(1 + r)(1 + r∗)](1−σ)t.
First, note that whenever a firm changes its payment contract, this implies that its expected
profits, quantities and profits under the new contract are at least as large as under the old
contract. Therefore, to prove the Proposition, it is sufficient to show that the statements on
export revenues and quantities hold when there is no contract change. Hence, noting that σ > 1,
i) and ii) follow directly from taking derivatives with respect to r, r∗, λ and λ∗, respectively.
Taking cross-derivatives with respect to t and r, r∗, λ and λ∗, respectively, proves iii).
Proof of Corollary 1 The log of expected quantities is lnE [qx] = lnA+ ln q∗d and the log of
expected revenues is lnE [Rx] = ln
(
β
αA
)
+ lnR∗d. As q
∗
d and R
∗
d are held constant, it remains
to be shown that lnA and ln
(
β
αA
)
behave as stated in the Corollary. For the three different
financing forms we have:
lnACIA = lnλ− σt ln(1 + r∗) ln
(
βCIA
αCIA
ACIA
)
= lnλ− (σ − 1)t ln(1 + r∗)
lnAOA = σ lnλ∗ − σt ln(1 + r) ln
(
βOA
αOA
AOA
)
= (σ − 1) lnλ∗ − (σ − 1) ln t(1 + r)
lnALC = −σt[ln(1 + r) + ln(1 + r∗)] ln
(
βLC
αLC
ALC
)
= −(σ − 1)t[ln(1 + r) + ln(1 + r∗)].
The statement in the Proof of Proposition 6 on contract switching remains valid. Again, i) and
ii) follow from taking derivatives with respect to r, r∗, λ and λ∗, respectively. iii) follows from
taking cross-derivatives with respect to t and r, r∗, λ and λ∗, respectively.
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B Wealth constraints
This section shows that a model with a limited value of contract constraint represents a special
case of a model with wealth constraints, where the wealth of the importer is set to zero. Let
Wi denote the level of wealth of a firm, which it can use to pay for any transactions additional
to any cash flow created arising from its economic activities.37 Assume for now that exporters
have sufficient wealth to finance production, i.e. WE > K.38 Assume that (under CIA and
LC) the importer can borrow against her expected future cash-flow from the trade transaction.
Then, under CIA, the new expected profit maximization problem is:
max
C
E
[
ΠCIAE
]
= CCIA − λK,
s.t. CCIA ≤WI + λR1 + r∗ , (wealth constraint)
and E
[
ΠCIAI
]
= λR− (1 + r∗)CCIA ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer)
The wealth constraint never binds and results do not change. Under OA the new expected
profit maximization problem is:
max
C
E
[
ΠOAE
]
=
1
1 + r
(λ∗COA −K(1 + r)),
s.t. COA ≤ R+WI , (wealth constraint)
and E
[
ΠOAI
]
=
1
1 + r∗
(R− λ∗COA) ≥ 0, (participation constraint importer)
Note that the wealth constraint binds whenever λ∗ ≤ RWI+R . The optimal payment amount
COA and the optimal discounted expected exporter profits can be derived as:
COA = min
{
R
λ∗
, R+WI
}
,
E
[
ΠOAE
]
=
R
1 + r
−K, (if wealth constraint not binding)
E
[
ΠOAE
]
=
λ∗
1 + r
(R+WI)−K. (if wealth constraint binding)
37The model could be extended to allow firms to borrow using their wealth as collateral. Then, the amount of
credit accessible would be increasing in the level of wealth and affected by institutional factors such as enforcement
and bankruptcy procedures.
38This assumption is to exclude some cases, which seem to be less interesting for the current analysis. Note
though, that payment contracts can indeed be a way to circumvent financial constraints for exporters. This point
is related to the use of foreign FDI to finance production in countries with stronger financing constraints. In a
Melitz (2003) type heterogeneous firms setup, payment contracts may be also used to shift the financing of sunk
fixed costs of exporting towards the importer’s financial market.
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Under LC the new expected profit maximization problem is:
max
C
E
[
ΠLCE
]
=
1
1 + r
(CLC −K(1 + r)),
s.t. CLC ≤WI + R1 + r∗ , (wealth constraint)
and E
[
ΠLCI
]
=
1
1 + r∗
(R− (1 + r∗)CLC) ≥ 0. (participation constraint importer)
The wealth constraint never binds and results do not change. It is straightforward to see that
for WI = 0 the model reduces to the model with limited value of contract constraint analyzed
in the main part.
C General Equilibrium
In the following the two country general equilibrium model is specified and solutions are derived.
Suppose there are two countries H and F.39 As derived in the previous sections, domestic and
foreign profits of firms in the differentiated goods sector are:
Πid = q
i
d
a
σ − 1 and Π
i
x = A
iΠjd, (37)
with Ai = (αi)σ(βi)1−σ. The free entry condition pins down both the number and the size of
firms in equilibrium. It requires the fixed cost of entry to equal expected profits from domestic
sales and exports:
f = Πid +Π
i
x ∀i ∈ H,F . (38)
The two free entry conditions can be solved for domestic and export quantities:40
qid =
σ − 1
a
f
1−Ai
1−AiAj , q
i
x = A
iqjd =
σ − 1
a
f
Ai(1−Aj)
1−AiAj . (40)
Total expected quantities are constant:
qi =
σ − 1
a
f. (41)
39For subsequent equations, I always use i, j ∈ {H,F}, i %= j
40Plugging in the values derived for profits from before delivers:
f =
a
σ − 1
h
qid +A
iqjd
i
. (39)
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Labor market clearing The number of firms in both countries is determined by the labor
market clearing condition.41 Given the CD preferences, a constant fraction of labor is employed
by the differentiated sector:
LiQ = µL
i. (42)
Labor in the differentiated sector is used for entry and production:
LiQ = L
i
E + L
i
P = n
i(f + aq). (43)
The number of firms can be derived as:
n =
µLi
f + aq
=
µLi
σf
. (44)
D FOB Prices
Given per unit cost a, different payment contracts imply different FOB prices. To see this, note
that from before the agreed on payment amounts C differ by payment contract, i.e.:
CCIA =
λ
1 + r∗
RCIA, COA = ROA, CLC =
RLC
1 + r∗
. (45)
This implies the following testable prediction:
Proposition 7 Suppose RCIA = ROA = RLC , λ < 1 and r∗ > 0. Then,
COA > CLC > CCIA.
Proof. Follows directly from Equations 45.
R is the amount of sales revenues in the importing country when trade takes place:
R =
(
β
α
)1−σ
r∗d. (46)
The following payment amounts corresponding to FOB prices can be derived:
CCIA = λ(1 + r∗)−σr∗d, C
OA = (λ∗)σ−1(1 + r)1−σr∗d, C
LC = (1 + r)1−σ(1 + r∗)−σr∗d. (47)
41For tractability, I assume that the positive expected profits of importers under Open Account do not enter
the demand for differentiated good. It would be interesting to analyze these ’informal’ profits explicitly in the
general equilibrium. This could be relevant for countries with very low enforcement rates.
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From this it can be seen that the amounts specified to be paid for the traded goods vary
with financial market parameters in a systematic way. Depending on the payment form used,
financial parameters affect FOB prices differentially. In an empirical analysis of FOB price data,
it might thus be relevant to control for differences in payment contracts. Estimates regarding
FOB prices and financial indicators might otherwise be biased.
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E Tables
Table 1. Country Types
This table reports the values for contract enforcement λ and interest rates 1 + r for the numerical example in
Section 4.4. Time to trade t is assumed to be 2 months. Annualized rates for working capital financing are 1.05,
1.07 and 1.14 for the three country types, respectively.
Country Type I II III
λ 0.99 0.94 0.98
1 + r 1.0082 1.0113 1.0221
Table 2. Optimal Payment Contracts
This table reports the optimal payment contracts chosen for trade between the three types of countries. Available
contracts are Cash in Advance (CIA), Open Account (OA) and Letter of Credit (LC).
from / to I II III
I CIA CIA CIA
II LC LC OA
III CIA CIA CIA
Table 3. Optimal Contract vs. Open Account
This table reports the percentage changes of home export quantities for all combinations of country types, when
every firm is restricted to use Open Account instead of using its optimal payment contract. The elasticity of
substitution is assumed to be σ = 4.
Only OA
from / to I II III
I -2.3 -16.1 1.0
II 0.7 -13.6 2.9
III -7.1 -20.1 -4.1
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Table 4. Financing Costs, Distance and Export Volumes
This table analyzes the relationship between financing costs in the source and the destination country and export
volumes. The regressions test for a direct effect of financing costs and for an effect of its interaction with distance.
The dependent variable is the log of exports from country i to country j in year t, 1987-2004. Financing costs are
measured by the net interest margin. Time to trade is proxied by the geographical distance between the main
cities of two countries. Contract enforcement is proxied by rule of law. GDPE and GDPI and PopE and PopI are
the log of GDP per capita and population of the exporting and importing country, respectively. The regressions
include a constant and control for exporter, importer and year fixed effects and (geographical and colonial)
bilateral controls as discussed in the text. Column 2 also controls for contract enforcement in both countries.
The rule of law variable is available for 1998, 2000, 2002-2004. Errors are clustered by exporter-importer pairs.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Dependent variable ln bilateral exports
Ln exp int 37.990*** 14.163***
(2.95) (4.04)
Ln imp int 47.062*** 23.723***
(3.08) (3.92)
Ln exp int x ln dist -4.675*** -1.929***
(0.07) (0.47)
Ln imp int x ln dist -5.762*** -2.913***
(0.07) (0.46)
Exp law x ln dist 0.177***
(0.03)
Imp law x ln dist 0.084***
(0.03)
Ln GDPE x ln dist -0.037
(0.03))
Ln GDPI x ln dist 0.166***
(0.03)
Ln dist -0.927*** -2.460***
(0.03) (0.29)
R-squared 0.796 0.792
N 142761 78742
# exporter-importer clusters 18260 17924
# exporters 144 144
Controls GDPE GDPI PopE PopI, Bil.Cont.
Fixed Effects Importer, Exporter, Year
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Table 5. Financial Development, Distance and Export Volumes
This table analyzes the relationship between financial development in the source and the destination country
and export volumes. The regressions test for a direct effect of financial development and for an effect of its
interaction with distance. The dependent variable is the log of exports from country i to country j in year
t, 1980-2004. Financial development is proxied by private credit over GDP. Time to trade is proxied by the
geographical distance between the main cities of two countries. Contract enforcement is proxied by rule of
law. GDPE and GDPI and PopE and PopI are the log of GDP and population of the exporting and importing
country, respectively. The regressions include a constant and control for exporter, importer and year fixed effects
and (geographical and colonial) bilateral controls as discussed in the text. Column 2 also controls for contract
enforcement in both countries. The rule of law variable is available for 1998, 2000, 2002-2004. Errors are clustered
by exporter-importer pairs. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
Dependent variable ln bilateral exports
Exp fin devt -4.092*** -3.102***
(0.29) (0.37)
Imp fin devt -4.956*** -2.213***
(0.30) (0.41)
Exp fin devt X ln dist 0.479*** 0.352***
(0.03) (0.04)
Imp fin devt X ln dist 0.562*** 0.256***
(0.03) (0.05)
Exp law X ln dist 0.101***
(0.03)
Imp law X ln dist -0.008
(0.03)
Ln GDPE X ln dist -0.077***
(0.03)
Ln GDPI X ln dist 0.168***
(0.03)
Ln dist -2.019*** -2.682***
(0.03) (0.27)
R-squared 0.771 0.784
N 228045 82812
# exporter-importer clusters 19253 18262
# exporters 150 150
Controls GDPE GDPI PopE PopI, Bil.Cont., Dist
Fixed Effects Importer, Exporter, Year
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